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Social Norms, Gender Roles and
Time Use: Multigenerational
Households in India
Aseem Hasnain and Abhilasha Srivastava
nlike Hollywood stories, marriage is not just
the beginning of the happily ever after, but
also the starting point for a number of hard
questions. Who will go out to work? Who will do
household chores? Who will look after the kids and
elderly? And so on. According to the Nobel laureate
economist, Gary Becker, the answer to these questions
comes from an unlikely but dependable source:
division of labor. His idea that rational calculations
may underpin romantic relationships goes back to
the 1970s when Becker first proposed an economic
model of marriage, arguing that marriage was based
on the principle of division of labor, and that gains
from marriage were determined by how efficient this
division was. The one with comparative advantage
at earning wages would go out and work; and the
other person would do the chores and stay at home.
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However, this model was contested by
feminist, institutional, and social economists who claimed that the couple
negotiated division of labor under the
inf luence of social norms, institutions,
biases, and power relations. This article
uses time use data from India to show
how household division of labor is not
simply a rational or objective decision
based on individual’s capacities to earn
wages in the market, but a complex
function of social norms and notions
about expected gender roles.
Over time, household division of labor
and its implications for individual wellbeing became an important area of
study for economists and sociologists
alike who were interested in studying
work-life balance, resource allocation, and bargaining within the family.
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Time use data, which was collected by
national statistical survey organizations
based in individual countries since the
early 1980’s, came in handy for this
purpose. This data revealed how much
time individuals devote to activities
such as paid work, unpaid work including household chores and childcare,
leisure, and self-care activities. This
data helped researchers in improving
their understanding about how people
made decisions about time and how it
affected their well-being. Surprisingly,
time use data also revealed a global
reality: despite an increase in married
women’s labor force participation, they
did disproportionately more unpaid
work than men. This anomaly was
starker in the Global South where a
large number of women never entered

the formal workforce, or quit jobs to
take care of children and the elderly
in multigenerational households.
However, scholarship on household
division of labor has tended to focus
on married couples in nuclear families
only, the dominant household structure
in advanced industrialized nations.
In developing economies, multigenerational households are common. These
households accommodate three to four
generations and make joint decisions
about consumption and division of
labor. Further, gender norms governing the multigenerational family differ
substantially from a nuclear family, as
there are multiple actors, both male
and female, with varying roles and
expectations living as one unit. In such
living arrangements, women undertake a disproportionately heavy load of
unpaid care work as there are almost no
market substitutes for such work; there
is poor infrastructure; and food security
is an ongoing concern. In India, the
multigenerational, patriarchal, patrilocal household is the prevalent form of
family, and about 312 million people
live in such an arrangement. A typical
multigenerational household includes
the husband’s parents—father-in-law,
mother-in-law, the husband (son), his
wife (daughter-in-law), and their children. Usually, the father-in-law makes
unilateral decisions about consumption
expenditures and distribution of public
goods within the household, while the
mother-in-law makes decisions about
division of labor. She passes on most of
the household work to the daughter-inlaw, according to traditionally established gender roles. The son (husband)
is usually the primary breadwinner, and
his wife (daughter-in-law) is subordinate to her husband as well as to her
parents-in-law.
In India, the multigenerational household creates the greatest restraint on the
daughter-in-law’s freedom. The typical
Indian bride enters a patriarchal family
through an arranged marriage, where
she is expected to become obedient to
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him and his parents. Along with her
husband, her mother-in-law also monitors her access to material resources
and external contacts. Consequently,
co-residence with in-laws is associated
with stricter gender norms and, in turn,
lower scores on measures of the daughter-in-law’s autonomy. The mother-inlaw plays a major role in encouraging
daughters-in-law to adhere to norms
such as ‘housework is the ideal wifely
duty.’ Thus in a multigeneration patriarchal household, the private sphere of
housework is negotiated and contested
between the two women, but under an
unequal power relation.
We use data from the only available,
nationally representative Indian time
use survey (1998-99) to show such a
division of labor in multigenerational
families.

Multi-tasking lady (Photo Credit: Zulfiqar Sheth, 2012).

Graph 1 shows time-allocation in
mean hours of work for all members of
the household. Activities are divided
into paid work (work done for wages
outside the house), unpaid housework

(cooking, cleaning, laundry and household repair and maintenance), unpaid
care work (care of children, sick and
elderly), and total work (total of paid
and unpaid work). Results point to a

GRAPH 1: T ime spent on different work activities (paid & unpaid) by all members
of the household in hours per day.
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strict division of household labor along
gender lines where men do most of
the work in the paid labor market and
women do all the unpaid work in the
household. Results also point to differences in housework allocation within
the same gender, with the daughtersin-law doing twice the amount of
unpaid work than their mothers-in-law.
Data shows that a daughter-in-law is
the most time-poor individual in the
multigenerational household as she
undertakes significantly more total
work, compared to all other members
in the household. Male members are
almost completely absent from dayto-day tasks within the house and the
division of labor in the household is
only between the mother-in-law and
daughter-in-law, with the daughtersin-law shouldering a disproportionately high burden of household chores
(known as reproductive work among
field specialists) in the household, as
much as 8 hours of unpaid work per day
and around 10.5 hours of total work
on average. The main takeaway from
this simple analysis is that males do
not do any unpaid work in their own
households, and the mother-in-law and
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Data shows that a daughter-in-law
is the most time-poor individual
in the multigenerational
household as she undertakes
significantly more total work,
compared to all other members
in the household.

daughter-in-law do all unpaid work
with the latter doing disproportionately
more work.
Data reveals surprising facts about the
effect of education on the division of
labor in the household. In his pioneering work on India, demographer John
Caldwell (1984) showed that universal
education or mass schooling changed
the cultural superstructure of society.
He argued that educated women see
themselves as part of a larger world
and education acts to reduce “the hold
of the patriarch,” prepares children
of both genders to work in a market
economy, and informs girls of their
economic options outside the home.
Caldwell also argued that education
transformed the power relationship in
a multigenerational household such
that, “a young woman with schooling
is more likely to challenge her in-laws,
and the in-laws are less likely to fight
the challenge” (412). According to
him educated daughters-in-law can
bargain successfully with less-educated

mothers-in-law for a larger slice of the
family budget to spend on food, and
health care for their children. Thus,
a young daughter-in-law’s education
tips the traditional balance of familial relationships in her favor, and by
extension she is likely to exert more
autonomy by doing less household
work and demanding equal participation from her mother-in-law. Therefore
one expects that an increase in the
education of a daughter-in-law would

GRAPH 2: T ime spent on different work activities (paid & unpaid) by daughterin-law in hours per day based on education levels.

decrease her unpaid work and increase
her paid work in the economy.
According to Caldwell’s thesis, their
paid work should increase, and unpaid work should decrease as their
education increases.
Graph 2 shows the amount of work
done by daughters-in-law based on
their educational levels. Interestingly,
we see the exact opposite: as the education level of a daughter-in-law in a
multigenerational household increases,
her paid work decreases while her
unpaid work increases. How do we
explain this anomaly?
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Patriarchal bargain theory (PBT) helps
explain how the increased bargaining power of an educated daughterin-law fails to decrease her burden of
unpaid household work or increase
her opportunities for paid work. PBT
notes that educated women are more
likely to resist patriarchal norms, and
are more likely to be subjected to violence in order to discipline and control their behavior inside and outside
the household. While one can argue
that patriarchal households should
thus prefer daughters-in-law with less
education, in reality the reverse happens. Marriage market preferences in
India are increasingly skewed towards
getting an educated bride because she is
thought to be better at raising children.
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This creates a dilemma in patriarchal
households that feel pressured to accept
educated brides for their sons, but
are not ready to accommodate their
terms. An educated daughter-in-law is
subjected to coercion and violence to
mold her according to the norms of the
patriarchal marital home. These norms
aim to confine her to unpaid work in
the household and to restrict her mobility outside the household. A woman’s
mobility outside the household is seen
as an opportunity for romantic or
sexual encounters out of wedlock, and
hence fiercely regulated in patriarchal
households. An educated bride does
not automatically consent to these
restrictions and so she is seen by her
marital family as a threat. Thus, a patriarchal household considers non-participation in market work by women as a
proxy for sexual fidelity and a marker
of family honor.
Since the son is usually employed and
away from the home during the day, the
task of confining an educated daughterin-law falls on the mother-in-law. She
makes sure that the daughter-in-law is
completely devoted to her household
duties. When a daughter-in-law is more
educated and assertive, her bargaining
power challenges the mother-in-law’s
authority. Thus the mother-in-law
exerts more power on the daughter-inlaw by giving her even more household
work. Within this patriarchal context,
daughters-in-law rarely rebel. Instead
they are more likely to internalize these
norms and do more housework in order
to prove themselves to be compliant
members of the household. In cases
where the daughter-in-law rebels,
violence is used. This is evident from
the thousands of reported cases of domestic violence in India.

Role of Caste and Class
While PBT helps explain the unexpected results of our time use patterns
among educated daughters-in-law,
these patterns vary based on the caste
and class position of the households.
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Caste and class heavily inf luence
practices such as marriage, divorce,
inheritance, and asset ownership in
India. These institutions also shape a
woman’s options outside the home and
her bargaining power inside it.
Graphs 3 and 4 show the time spent per
day on different work activities (paid &
unpaid) by daughters-in-law based on
caste and class identities. Graph 3 shows

that daughters-in-law from ‘upper
caste’ households (known as ‘General’
castes in India) do more unpaid work
and less paid work per day as compared
to daughters-in-laws from ‘lower caste’
households. Among these marginalized
‘lower caste’ groups exist two specific
categories of communities that the
Indian constitution lists as Scheduled
Caste (SC), and Scheduled Tribes (ST).

GRAPH 3: T ime spent on different work activities (paid & unpaid) by daughterin-law in hours per day based on caste.
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GRAPH 4: T ime spent on different work activities (paid & unpaid) by daughter-inlaw in hours per day based on class.
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more time in household/care work.
But for lower-class married women,
working outside the home is inevitable
and is seen as a necessary evil given the
need for additional income. Increased
education is less likely to be a source of
bargaining power for upper caste/class
daughters-in-law, who are more likely
to be constrained by caste and class than
lower caste/class daughters-in-law.

Conclusion

Cartoon featured in The Hindu, 2011.

Graph 4 shows that daughters-in-law
from upper class households do more
unpaid work and less paid work per day
as compared to daughters-in-law from
lower class households.
Within the sensibilities of the Indian
caste system, the higher a particular
caste group is perceived to be, the
lesser market work is expected from
its women. This means that ‘higher’
caste households tend to diminish the
preference for obtaining work and
incidence of women’s employment
outside the household. On the other
hand, such norms are less likely to be
imposed in households that belong to
the ‘lower’ castes. These restrictions
on the bargaining power of Indian

women are part of the patriarchal setup
where contact with males outside the
household is deemed as ‘polluting’ and
is to be avoided at all cost. Therefore
working outside, especially for young
married women, is considered socially
degrading for the household, and working inside the house is considered a pure
form of wifely duty that is enforced as
well as rewarded. This effect is particularly strong for the daughters-in-law in
‘upper’ caste households, causing educated daughters-in-law in ‘upper’ caste
households to do relatively more housework compared to the ‘lower’ caste
household. Since caste and class status
in India are highly correlated, upper
class women also strictly specialize
in household management, spending

The main takeaway from this
simple analysis is that males do not
do any unpaid work in their own
households, and the mother-inlaw and daughter-in-law do all
unpaid work with the latter doing
disproportionately more work.
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It is easy to imagine that one chooses to
spend time based on one’s educational
qualifications, job, business or interests.
However, data shows that social norms
and expectations, such as gender roles,
play an important role in these decisions. This short piece analyzes the
Indian time use survey to show how
individuals spend their time not just
of their own volition but under the
inf luence of complex societal factors.
Finally, these factors are not the same
for everyone, but differ based on the
privileges of age, household structure,
caste, and class.
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